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1 Introduction
Considerable evidence from psychology suggests that individuals tend to
overestimate their own skills (e.g. Larwood and Whittaker, 1977; Weinstein,
1980; Svenson, 1981; or Taylor and Brown, 1988; for recent reviews see Alicke
and Govorun, 2005; Moore and Healy, 2008; or Skata, 2008).1 Given the ap-
parent relevance of the phenomenon for many economic contexts, the effects
of overconfidence have also received considerable attention in the economic
literature in recent years. For example, Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and
Tate (2005, 2008) find that managers who overestimate their ability under-
take more welfare reducing mergers and investments. Moreover, according
to Kyle and Wang (1997) and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) overconfident fund-
managers are promoted with higher probability due to the higher profits they
gain, while Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) find that overconfidence leads to
excessive trading of stock-traders. Despite the differences in the desirability
of eventual outcomes, one general pattern seems to be that individuals who
overestimate their own skill tend to work harder than individuals assessing
their ability correctly (see also Felson, 1984; Locke and Latham, 1990; Heath
et al., 1999; and more recently Zhang and Fishbach, 2010).
In the present paper, we take up the discussion about the effects of over-
confidence and analyse a general model of a teamwork situation with effort
complementarities. Different from the previous literature on the effects of
overconfidence (e.g. Hvide, 2002; de la Rosa, 2007; Gervais and Goldstein,
2007; or Santos-Pinto, 2008),2, however, we do not only consider the poten-
1Note that the notion of overconfidence in general is not uncontested (e.g. Gigerenzer
et al., 1991, and Juslin, 1994; replies by Griffin and Tversky, 1992, and Kahnemann and
Tversky, 1996). Recent meta-studies by Koehler et al. (2002) and Brenner and Griffin
(2004), however, describe overconfidence as a prevalent phenomenon.
2Hvide (2002) considers a case where the agent can actually choose the beliefs about his
ability and shows that biased beliefs can be beneficial to the agent as they may improve
his outside option while they are detrimental for the firm. De la Rosa (2007) analyses
welfare effects of overconfidence in a setting in which firms compete for an overconfident
and risk-averse agent; he finds that the agent benefits when his bias is moderate. Along the
same lines, Gervais and Goldstein (2007) analyse a model of team production with effort
complementarities and show how overconfidence reduces free-riding and might increase
both a rational as well as an overconfident agent’s welfare and give rise to a Pareto-
improvement. Focusing on the principal, Santos-Pinto (2008) considers a situation where
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tial advantage overconfident agents may have in a team of mainly rational
agents but also ask how individual payoffs are affected if overconfidence be-
comes more common, i.e. affects both team members, and develops in a way
that is “individually optimal” in terms of the agents’ awareness of the biases
of others.
As the subsequent analysis shows, overconfidence may not only enhance
the team productivity (due to increased efforts) but also the welfare of the
biased agent himself, and this holds in a team of one overconfident and one
rational agent as well as in a team of two overconfident agents. Moreover,
the result is particularly strong if the considered agent’s overconfidence is
combined with unawareness of other people’s biases (despite the fact that
being aware of the other’s bias is closer to the true state of the world). Thus,
our results not only provide a potential rationale for the wide dissemination
of overconfidence suggested by the studies cited above. They also provide a
potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident people
tend to be unaware of the biases of others (Ludwig and Nafziger, 2011).
The intuition behind these results is rather straightforward: Due to the
effects of synergy, overconfidence of another team member increases the op-
timal effort level for any agent who is aware of this bias. However, if an
agent is overconfident himself, his effort level is already above the individual
optimum – because of his own bias which he is unaware of. Awareness of
a colleague’s bias, then, leads to a further (suboptimal) increase in his ef-
fort. By contrast, lack of such awareness keeps the expectation about the
colleague’s effort and, hence, the agent’s extra effort, which he exerts in order
to exploit effort complementarities, low. In combination with the increase in
the agent’s effort due to his own overconfidence, the agent’s effort choice gets
closer to the overall individual optimum than if he were aware of the other’s
bias. In a sense, all necessary upward-adjustments in the agent’s effort (in
order to exploit the synergies from the colleague’s overconfidence) are already
accounted for in the agent’s effort choice – although for a different reason,
the principal can condition wages on each agent’s output; he shows that overconfidence is
beneficial for the principal if effort is observable while it need not be in the presence of
moral hazard.
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namely the agent’s own overconfidence (which he is unaware of). And this
intuition essentially covers both cases, i.e. a team with one biased and one
rational agent and a team with two biased agents.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our base-
line model of a teamwork situation with effort complementarities. Section
3 introduces overconfidence in a team of one overconfident and one rational
agent. Moving to teams of two overconfident agents, Section 4 consider the
effects of changes in the information structure in such instances. Section 5,
then, compares teams of two overconfident agents with teams of two rational
agents and summarises the main points of the analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
Consider an all-equity firm that is owned by risk neutral shareholders. The
firm’s output generates from a single one-period project which is carried out
by two risk neutral agents, i = 1, 2, where teamwork is implemented in or-
der to create positive externalities.3 The value of the project is the value
of its expected cash flow which depends on the agents’ efforts, ei, and their
abilities, ai; for the sake of argument, we assume a1 = a2 = a.
4 More-
over, we assume that agent i‘s expected return from the project, denoted by
Ri(ei, e−i), is increasing in effort and ability and that the marginal return
to effort is increasing in ability, i.e. d2Ri/deidai > 0. The agents’ cost of
effort is denoted by c(ei) with c(0) = 0, c
′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. Finally, in order
to make the subsequent discussion meaningful, we assume that the agents’
3On positive externalities through teamwork see e.g. Alchian and Demsetz (1972),
Grossmann and Hart (1986), Alchian and Woodward (1987), Aghion and Tirole (1994),
Jensen and Meckling (1995), or Holmstro¨m and Roberts (1998).
4Note that assuming equal ability is not restrictive for the present argument. In partic-
ular, the focus of the analysis is on the individual effects of overconfidence and information
about such biases of other team members. And, as such, the discussion is essentially con-
fined to the consequences of changes in these parameters for one of the two agents. In
fact, actual ability is not explicitly accounted for as we will treat it as fixed throughout
the analysis.
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efforts are strategic complements, i.e.:5
dei
de−i
> 0 . (1)
Under the above assumptions, the maximisation problem of agent i can
be written as follows:
max
ei
Ri(ei, e−i)− c(ei), (2)
with first-order condition (FOC):
Riei(ei, e−i) = c
′(ei). (3)
Moreover, the corresponding second-order condition (SOC) is satisfied if:
Rieiei(ei, e−i)− c′′(ei) < 0, (4)
which we assume to hold in the following.
Substituting the corresponding equilibrium efforts, denoted by e∗i with
i = 1, 2, into the agents’ payoff functions, we obtain the following general
expression for the agents’ equilibrium payoffs in the case without overconfi-
dence:
Ui(e
∗
i , e
∗
−i) = R
i(e∗i , e
∗
−i)− c(e∗i ). (5)
These payoffs will serve as our benchmark for later comparisons.
3 Overconfidence
In order to analyse the effects of overconfidence, we first consider a team in
which one agent, say agent 2, is overconfident while the other agent, agent 1,
is rational and aware of agent 2’s bias. In particular, we assume that agent 2
overrates his own skill by b2 > 0, i.e. his perceived ability is a
′
2 := a + b2.
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5Efforts being strategic complements corresponds to the slope of the best reply being
positive, which is here deide−i =
Rieie−i (ei,e−i)
c′′(ei)
> 0.
6Note that we consider overconfidence in the form of overestimation of one’s absolute
ability (see, e.g., Gervais and Goldstein, 2007, for a similar approach). In general, over-
confidence can arise in other forms like overestimation of relative abilities (“better-than-
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Moreover, we assume that agent 2 is not aware of his own bias so that agent
2’s maximisation problem can be written as follows:7
max
e2
R˜2(e1, e2 | b2)− c(e2), (6)
where R˜2(e1, e2 | b2) denotes the expected return to the project as (wrongly)
perceived by the biased agent 2, i.e. R˜2(e1, e2 | b2) = R2(e1, e2 |a1 = a, a2 =
a + b2). The resulting FOC is given by:
R˜2e2(e1, e2 | b2) = c′(e2) , (7)
with SOC:
R˜2e2e2(e1, e2 | b2)− c′′(e2) < 0. (8)
Note that, compared to a situation without overconfidence (b2 = 0) the
effort of agent 2 increases, for a given effort level of agent 1, as the marginal
return to effort of agent 2 is increasing in b2:
de2
db2
= − R˜
2
e2b2
(e1, e2 | b2)
R˜2e2e2(e1, e2 | b2)− c′′(e2)
> 0; (9)
recall that, by construction, the nominator of (9) is positive — due to the
assumed positive effect of the agents’ ability on marginal productivity — and
the denominator is negative which follows from the SOC (see (4) and (8)).
The maximisation problem of agent 1, in turn, is the same as described
in the baseline model of a fully rational team except that agent 1 now takes
the bias b2 of agent 2 into account; i.e. agent 1 knows that agent 2’s effort
changes due to his overconfidence and accounts for this. Thus, agent 1 knows
that agent 2 is biased and while agent 2 knows this, he disagrees with agent
1, i.e. the agents agree to disagree as, for example, in Morris (1996) and
Squintani (2006).8
average effect”, e.g. Svenson, 1981); or personal control (“illusion of control”, e.g. Langer,
1975); as well as unrealistic optimism about the future (e.g. Weinstein, 1989).
7Note that overconfidence would have no behavioural effect if agents were aware of
their bias (and otherwise rational, i.e. expected utility maximisers).
8Note that beliefs in this type of argument are used essentially to motivate equilib-
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Denoting the resulting equilibrium efforts with eˆ1 and eˆ2, the agents’
individual equilibrium payoffs based on actual and not perceived abilities
(and thus actual rewards) are:
Ui(eˆi, eˆ−i) = Ri(eˆi, eˆ−i)− c(eˆi). (10)
The qualitative effect of changes in agent 2’s perceived ability on agent 1’s
expected payoff, then, can be summarised as follows; for any b2 ∈ [0, b¯),
where b¯ denotes some upper bound on agent 2’s bias (possibly b¯ = ∞), it
holds that
dU1(eˆ1, eˆ2)
db2
=
∂U1(e1, e2)
∂e1
de1
db2
+
∂U1(e1, e2)
∂e2
de2
db2
= 0 + R1e2(e1, e2)
de2
db2
> 0.
(11)
As the first term is zero by the envelope theorem, the impact of agent 2’s
overconfidence on agent 1’s payoff depends on the sign of the strategic effect
which is positive. Hence, agent 1’s expected payoff increases in agent 2’s
overconfidence.
Furthermore, the impact of b2 on agent 2’s own expected payoff is given
by:
dU2(eˆ1, eˆ2)
db2
=
∂U2(e1, e2)
∂e1
de1
db2
+
∂U2(e1, e2)
∂e2
de2
db2
= R2e1(e1, e2)
de1
db2
+ (R2e2(e1, e2)− c′(e2))
de2
db2
.
(12)
rium behaviour but are not themselves part of the equilibrium in that they have to be
correct. This is somewhat similar to models of level-k thinking used to analyse initial
responses in normal form games (see, for example, Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001;
or Crawford and Iriberri, 2007). In view of applications, such an implicit exclusion of
the consistency condition regarding beliefs appears to be a justifiable simplification, for
example, in settings where there are few opportunities for learning (e.g. due to a low fre-
quency of repetition) or where the common restrictions of the agents’ mental capacities
are binding (e.g. due to time constraints or some other details of the job the agents have
to carry out).
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The first term again reflects the strategic effect, which is positive as (1) efforts
are strategic complements, i.e. de1
de2
> 0, by assumption and (2) agent 2’s effort
is increasing in his bias b2, i.e.
de2
db2
> 0, as the marginal return to effort is
increasing in ability.
By contrast, the second term, which reflects the payoff effect of agent 2’s
mistaken belief about his own ability, is, of course, negative as the mistaken
belief induces agent 2 to exert too much effort, i.e. eˆ2 > arg maxe2 R
2(eˆ1, e2)−
c(e2) which in turn implies R
2
e2
(eˆ1, eˆ2) < c
′(eˆ2).
Eventually, the overall effect on agent 2’s expected payoff is determined by
the trade-off between the strategic effect and the effect of agent 2’s mistaken
belief. In particular, if synergy effects are large, the strategic effect dominates
and agent 2’s payoff increases in b2; this also holds if both synergy effects
and agent 2’s bias are small as a small bias results in a moderate increase in
agent 2’s effort and thus the mistaken belief effect is negligible. If synergies
are small while the bias is comparably large, though, the overall effect on
agent 2’s utility is negative.
The overall effect of agent 2’s overconfidence on agent 1’s expected payoff,
by contrast, depends only on the sign of the strategic effect which is positive.
Accordingly, agent 1’s payoff always increases in agent 2’s overconfidence.
Summing up, both agents’ efforts increase in b2 if efforts are strategic
complements and the marginal return to effort of agent 2 is increasing in
b2 – as assumed for the present discussion. Moreover, such an increase in
efforts does not only lead to a higher team productivity (i.e. a higher firm
value) and a higher expected payoff of agent 1 (which is increasing in b2).
It also increases the expected payoff of the overconfident agent 2, provided
that either synergies are large or, if they are small, also the bias itself b2 is
sufficiently small. Intuitively, the latter effect is due to the fact that agent 2
benefits from the positive externalities of the increased effort of agent 1. Even
if these externalities are rather small, this effect outweighs the decrease in
expected payoff resulting from agent 2’s increased effort as long as the extent
of overconfidence is moderate. Thus, we conclude:
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Lemma 1 Within the considered model of team production, being overcon-
fident (and paired with a rational agent) increases the payoff of the overcon-
fident agent if either synergy effects are sufficiently large or if both synergy
effects and the agent’s bias are small.
4 Bias-Awareness
In a next step, we turn to the discussion of teams which consist of two
overconfident agents and address the question whether it is optimal for either
agent to be informed or ignorant regarding the bias of his colleague. In doing
so, we distinguish three settings: (Case 1) both agents are unaware of each
other’s biases; (Case 2) one agent is aware of the other’s bias while the other
agent is unaware of the colleague’s bias; (Case 3) both agents are aware of
each other’s bias. As we will see, it is always better for agent 2 to be unaware
of his colleague’s overconfidence – irrespective of whether agent 1 is aware or
unaware of agent 2’s bias. The section concludes with some brief statements
about the effect of partial awareness.
Case 1: Both agents are unaware of each other’s bias.
If both agents are overconfident but unaware of their colleague’s bias, each
agent’s decision situation is basically analogous to the situation of agent 2
considered in Section 3, i.e. the situation where an overconfident agent 2 is
paired with a rational agent 1. Thus, the derivation of the maximisation
problems and equilibrium efforts for both agents is analogous to that for
agent 2 in the previous section.9 Accordingly, agent 2’s decision in the present
setting is identical to the one discussed in Section 3:
e002 = eˆ2.
10 (13)
9Since both agents are unaware of each other’s bias, both believe that the colleague
is unbiased. Moreover, each agent is unaware of the own bias. Thus, the agents’ beliefs
are effectively inconsistent with actual strategies (as they are unaware of the biases); see
also footnote 8. However, as soon as we deal with biased agents, consistency of beliefs is
always an issue as biased agents, by definition, are at least unaware of their own bias.
10Here as below, the double digit in the exponent (“00” in this case) refers to the
agents’ awareness of biases: the first digit refers to agent 1 and the second to agent 2 (“0”
9
Agent 1, in turn, now acts in the same way as agent 2; i.e. he also increases
his effort compared to the individually rational level, e∗1, because of his own
overconfidence (but no longer, as he did before, because of – the knowledge
of – his colleague’s bias). Thus, agent 1’s maximisation problem is given by:
max
e1
R˜1(e1, e2 | b1)− c(e1), (14)
with corresponding FOC:
R˜1e1(e1, e2 | b1) = c′(e1); (15)
and SOC:
R˜1e1e1(e1, e2 | b1)− c′′(e1) < 0. (16)
Denoting the resulting equilibrium effort by e001 , we obtain the following
equilibrium payoffs based on actual abilities:11
U001 := U1(e
00
1 , e
00
2 ) = R
1(e001 , e
00
2 )− c(e001 ) (17)
and
U002 := U2(e
00
1 , e
00
2 ) = R
2(e001 , e
00
2 )− c(e002 ). (18)
In order to determine the effect of an agent’s bias on his own payoff, we
have to consider the derivative of U11i with respect to bi:
dU00i (e
00
1 , e
00
2 )
dbi
=
∂Ui(e
00
1 , e
00
2 )
∂ei
de00i
dbi
+
∂Ui(e
00
1 , e
00
2 )
∂e−i
de00−i
dbi
= (Riei(e
00
1 , e
00
2 )− c′(e00i ))
de00i
dbi
+ Rie−i(e
00
1 , e
00
2 )
de00−i
dbi
.
(19)
Note that the first term of this expression derives from agent i’s mistaken
belief and is negative as dei
dbi
> 0 (recall that the marginal return to effort was
assumed to increase in ability). Moreover, the strategic effect is zero as both
indicating unawareness of the respective other agent’s bias and “1” indicating awareness
of it).
11Note that, as both agents are unaware of the other’s bias, equilibrium efforts only
depend on each agent’s own bias.
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agents are unaware of the other’s bias, i.e. de−i
dbi
= 0. Thus, we conclude:
Lemma 2 Being overconfident reduces agent i’s payoff if agent −i is un-
aware of this bias.
Case 2: One agent is aware, one unaware of the other’s bias.
Suppose agent 2 is aware of the bias of agent 1 but agent 1 is still unaware
of his colleague’s bias.12 Obviously, the maximisation problem and the cor-
responding equilibrium effort of agent 1 remain the same as in Case 1. Thus,
we have:13
e011 = e
00
1 . (20)
For agent 2, however, things are different. In particular, agent 2 now
accounts for agent 1’s overconfidence. Thus, as efforts are strategic comple-
ments, agent 2’s effort increases in b1 (because agent 1’s marginal return to
effort increases in b1):
de012
db1
=
de012
de011
de011
db1
= − R˜
1
e1b1
(e011 , e
01
2 |b1)
R˜1e1e1(e
01
1 , e
01
2 |b1)− c′′(e011 )
de012
de011
. (21)
Note that there are now two reasons for agent 2 to increase his effort: (1)
the biased perception of his own ability (which he is not aware of), and (2)
the awareness of the colleague’s overconfidence. Thus, agent 2’s effort is not
only higher than in the fully rational team, but also higher than his effort in
the case where he is unaware of agent 1’s bias, i.e.:
e012 > e
00
2 . (22)
This implies that the team’s productivity is increased compared to the fully
rational team and the team with two overconfident agents who are both
unaware of their colleague’s bias.14
12Due to the symmetry of the problem, the case that agent 1 is aware of agent 2’s bias
follows immediately from interchanging the agents.
13Note that “01” in the exponent now indicates that agent 1 is unaware of agent 2’s
bias while agent 2 is aware of agent 1’s bias.
14It can also be shown that the team’s productivity increases compared to the team
with only one overconfident agent.
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Moreover, the corresponding equilibrium payoffs of the agents in this case
are as follows:
U011 := U1(e
01
1 , e
01
2 ) = U1(e
00
1 , e
01
2 ) = R
1(e001 , e
01
2 )− c(e001 ) (23)
and
U012 := U2(e
01
1 , e
01
2 ) = U2(e
00
1 , e
01
2 ) = R
2(e001 , e
01
2 )− c(e012 ). (24)
Payoff comparison when one agent is unaware of the colleague’s bias.
A simple payoff comparison yields that if one agent, say agent 1, is unaware
of agent 2’s bias, agent 2 is better off being unaware of the bias of agent 1:
U002 > U
01
2 ⇔ R2(e001 , e002 )− c(e002 ) > R2(e001 , e012 )− c(e012 ), (25)
as R2(e1, e2)− c(e2) is concave and e012 > e002 > arg maxe2 R2(e001 , e2)− c(e2).
Intuitively, accounting for agent 1’s overconfidence induces agent 2 to
further increase his effort in an attempt to exploit effort complementarities.
Yet, his effort is already above the individual optimum – because of his own
overconfidence – and the further increase in effort is not complemented by
agent 1. Thus, we conclude:
Lemma 3 If both agents are overconfident and agent 1 is unaware of the bias
of agent 2, then agent 2, ceteris paribus, is better off if he is also unaware of
agent 1’s bias than if he were aware of it.
Case 3: Both agents are aware of each other’s bias.
The situation in which both agents are aware of each other’s bias is analogous
to the situation of agent 2 in Case 2 where agent 2 is aware of agent 1’s bias;
i.e. the equilibrium effort level of agent 2 is given by:
e112 = e
01
2 . (26)
However, for agent 1, who now takes into account the bias of agent 2, the
12
equilibrium effort level is increased compared to Case 2:
e111 > e
01
1 , (27)
as efforts are strategic complements and agent 2’s marginal return to effort
is increasing in his bias. Note that under these conditions both agents in-
crease their effort for two reasons: (1) their own overconfidence and (2) their
attempt to complement their colleague’s increased effort.
Accordingly, the agents’ resulting equilibrium payoffs in this case are
given by:
U111 := U1(e
11
1 , e
11
2 ) = U1(e
11
1 , e
01
2 ) = R
1(e111 , e
01
2 )− c(e111 ) (28)
and
U112 := U2(e
11
1 , e
11
2 ) = U2(e
11
1 , e
01
2 ) = R
2(e111 , e
01
2 )− c(e012 ). (29)
Payoff comparison when one agent is aware of the colleague’s bias.
Next, we consider agent 2 and compare his payoff for the case where he is
aware of agent 1’s bias with the case where he is not – assuming that agent 1
is aware of agent 2’s bias. A comparison of agent 2’s payoff in both instances
shows that being unaware of agent 1’s bias is preferable for agent 2 if the
following holds:15
U102 > U
11
2 ⇔ R2(e111 , e002 )− c(e002 ) > R2(e111 , e012 )− c(e012 ), (30)
as R2(e1, e2)− c(e2) is concave and e012 > e002 > arg maxe2 R2(e1, e2)− c(e2).16
The intuition for this result is the same as before: Complementing agent
1’s additional effort is detrimental for agent 2 because agent 2’s effort is
15Recall that the “01” in the exponent refers to the case where both agents are overcon-
fident but only agent 1 is aware of the bias of agent 2, which is analogous to Case 2 except
that the information structure is reversed. Note further that e102 = e
00
2 and e
10
1 = e
11
1 .
16Irrespective of whether agent 2 is aware or unaware of agent 1’s bias, it is obviously
better for agent 2 if agent 1 is aware of agent 2’s bias, than if he is not, i.e. U112 > U
01
2
⇔ R2(e111 , e012 )−c(e012 ) > R2(e011 , e012 )−c(e012 ) as e111 > e011 and U102 > U002 ⇔ R2(e111 , e002 )−
c(e002 ) > R
2(e001 , e
00
2 )− c(e002 ) as e111 = e101 > e001 .
13
already above the optimum – due to his own bias – and because the further
increase is not complemented by agent 1. Similar to the previous situation,
we thus conclude:
Lemma 4 If both agents are overconfident and agent 1 is aware of the bias
of agent 2, then agent 2, ceteris paribus, is better off if he is unaware of agent
1’s bias.
Consequences of Partial Awareness.
Finally, we want to briefly comment on the effects of partial awareness of
biases; see Appendix A for a formal discussion. For the sake of argument,
we assume that an agent who is “partially aware” of his colleague’s overcon-
fidence assigns probability p ∈ [0, 1] to the case that his colleague has bias
bi > 0, where bi is the true bias of agent i.
17 As it turns out, partial awareness
essentially reduces the strength of the effects discussed above while keeping
the direction of changes. In particular, it holds (see Appendix A for a formal
derivation):
Lemma 5 An agent is best off being unaware of the colleague’s bias; and
being partially aware is better than being fully aware. Moreover, for an over-
confident agent it is optimal if his colleague is fully aware of the bias; and
partial awareness is better than unawareness.
5 Comparison with Rational Team
In the previous sections, we have shown that within the proposed model of
team production (1) overconfidence can be beneficial for the biased agent
and (2) if an agent is overconfident, it is always best for him to be unaware
of a potential bias of his colleague. In view of a general comparison between
rational and overconfident agents, however, it is also interesting to ask how
individual payoffs in a team of two overconfident agents compare to those in
17It is straightforward to generalize our analysis to more general cases of “partial aware-
ness”, where an agent attaches different probabilities to different sizes of the bias.
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a fully rational team. In the remainder of this section, we show that, under
fairly weak conditions, individual payoffs in a team of two overconfident
agents are higher than in a team of two rational agents.
Consider a situation in which both agents are overconfident but unaware
of their colleague’s bias, i.e. a situation where overconfidence is present in its
“individually optimal” form (i.e. when combined with unawareness of the
colleague’s bias). Thus, both agents’ overconfidence is not complemented by
an increased effort of the respective colleague through awareness of biases.
In order to obtain a clear picture for the comparison of individual payoffs
for this scenario let us first consider the case in which one agent, agent i,
is biased and the other agent exerts his benchmark equilibrium effort e∗−i
(e.g. because he is rational but unaware of his colleague’s bias). For this
case, the following holds:
Ri(e00i , e
∗
−i)− c(e00i ) < Ri(e∗i , e∗−i)− c(e∗i ), (31)
as Ri is concave and e00i > e
∗
i = arg maxei R
i(ei, e
∗
−i) − c(ei). However,
we already know from the previous discussion that e00−i > e
∗
−i and that being
biased is beneficial if the own increased effort is complemented by an increase
in the effort of the colleague (who knows about the bias and wants to exploit
synergy effects). But, of course, an increased effort of agent −i, which results
from agent −i’s own bias, can increase the payoff of agent i in essentially
the same way as an increase in agent −i’s effort resulting from an attempt
to optimally exploit synergy effects (provided that the synergy effects are
sufficiently large). In this case, we have:
Ri(e00i , e
00
−i)− c(e00i ) > Ri(e∗i , e∗−i)− c(e∗i ), (32)
In fact, the comparison remains positive also for small synergy effects if biases
are moderate. Intuitively, this holds as a small bias of agent i induces only
a moderate increase in agent i’s own effort. Hence, a smaller “synergetic
feedback” through agent −i’s effort is required to “reimburse” the biased
agent i.
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Summing up, the above result in favour of overconfidence is rather intu-
itive as we have already seen that individual payoffs for a biased agent in a
team of one overconfident and one rational agent are increased (cf. Section
3). The maximisation problem of the overconfident agent, say agent 2, is the
same in both the team with one and the team with two overconfident agents:
He is biased himself (and unaware of his bias) and thinks his colleague, agent
1, is unbiased and, hence, will exert the same effort in both cases. Moreover,
if the additional effort exerted by a rational agent 1 in order to complement
agent 2’s additional effort (due to agent 2’s overconfidence) is enough to over-
compensate agent 2 for his increased effort cost, then it is natural to expect
that an overconfidence bias of agent 1 has a similar effect. Eventually, both
the awareness of agent 2’s bias (of the rational agent 1) and the own over-
confidence of agent 1 have a similar effort enhancing effect; and the increased
effort of agent 1 (due to his overconfidence) is what compensates agent 2 for
his additional cost.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the favourable comparison of indi-
vidual payoffs in an overconfident team with those in a fully rational team
does not depend on the overconfident agents’ unawareness of their colleague’s
bias. In fact, even if one or both agents are (partially) aware of their col-
league’s bias, individual payoffs are higher than those in a fully rational team
if either synergy effects are comparably large, or if synergy effects are small
and biases are moderate; see Appendix B for a more detailed argument.
Proposition 1 below qualitatively summarises the main points of the pre-
ceding discussion.
Proposition 1 For the above model of team production with synergy effects,
the following results hold:
1. Individual payoffs in a team of one overconfident and one rational agent
are higher than those in a team with two rational agents — provided
that the rational agent is aware of his colleague’s bias and either synergy
effects are sufficiently large, or synergy effects are small and the bias is
moderate.
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2. The individual payoff of an overconfident agent whose colleague is also
overconfident is always higher if he is not aware of his colleague’s bias
(irrespective of whether the colleague is aware of the other agent’s bias).
3. Individual payoffs in a team of two overconfident agents which are both
unaware of the other’s bias are higher than those in a team of two
rational agents — provided that either synergy effects are sufficiently
large, or synergy effects are small and biases are moderate.18
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have considered an intuitive model of team production with
effort complementarities in order to emphasise the potentially positive effects
of being overconfident. As we have shown, a more rational perspective on
others, i.e. awareness of the overconfidence of others, is suboptimal for an
agent who is overconfident himself. More specifically, within the considered
model of team production, the payoff of an overconfident agent, whose col-
league is also overconfident, is always higher if he is unaware of his colleague’s
bias. Thus, although the empirical evidence on the matter is scarce, our re-
sults provide a possible rationale for why many people appear to be unaware
of the overconfidence biases of others (cf. Ludwig and Nafziger, 2011).
Moreover, we have shown that individual payoffs in both a team of a ra-
tional and an overconfident agent as well as in a team of two overconfident
agents are higher than in a team with two rational agents whenever either
synergy effects are sufficiently large or biases are moderate. Thus, the present
analysis gives further support to the notion that being overconfident is ben-
eficial not only in view of aggregate outcomes (as overconfidence seems to
enhance effort and therefore team productivity) but also for the overconfident
individuals themselves. In fact, the analysis also suggests that overconfident
agents have no incentive to gather information about a colleague’s poten-
18Here we consider only the case in which information about biases is optimal, i.e. biased
agents are unaware of the biases of others. Similar results hold if one or both agents are
(partially) aware of the bias of their colleague, albeit with slightly stricter restrictions on
synergy effects and the size of the biases.
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tially biased self-perception (even if such information was costless). Thus,
our results provide a possible rationale for why overconfidence may indeed
be (and remain) as widespread a phenomenon as empirical and experimental
research indicates.
Appendix
A. Partial Awareness
In order to model a situation in which agent i is uncertain of his colleague’s
bias, we assume that agent i assigns probability p ∈ [0, 1] to the case that his
colleague −i has bias b−i > 0. For the sake of argument, suppose i = 1. Thus,
agent 1 believes that with probability p agent 2 follows equilibrium strategy
e˜2 (where the tilde denotes that agent 2 is biased) and with probability 1− p
strategy e2. Accordingly, agent 1 has to solve the following maximisation
problem:
max
e1
p · R˜1(e1, e˜2|b1) + (1− p) · R˜1(e1, e2|b1)− c(e1) , (33)
with FOC:
p · R˜1e1(e1, e˜2|b1) + (1− p) · R˜1e1(e1, e2|b1) = c′(e1). (34)
Since (by assumption) an agent’s effort rises in his ability and, hence, in
his bias, i.e. de2
db2
> 0, we have e˜2 > e2. Moreover, as efforts are strategic
complements, it follows:
R˜1e1(e1, e˜2|b1) > R˜1e1(e1, e2|b1). (35)
Hence, the left hand side of the FOC must be increasing in p. For p = 1,
agent 1 attaches probability one to the case that agent 2 has bias b2 (which
corresponds to the case that agent 1 is completely aware of agent 2’s bias).
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In this case, the FOC becomes:
R˜1e1(e1, e˜2|b1) = c(e1). (36)
Obviously, the left hand side of this FOC is larger than if agent 1 is aware of
agent 2’s bias. Hence, also the right hand side must be larger.
As c′′ > 0, by assumption, agent 1 exerts a higher effort if he is aware
of agent 2’s bias than if he is partially aware of it – irrespective of whether
agent 2 is (partially) aware or unaware of agent 1’s bias. Thus, we have
epk1 ≤ e1k1 (with equality if p = 1), where the exponent p indicates that agent
1 is partially aware of agent 2’s bias, and k ∈ [0, 1] indicates that agent 2
is unaware / partially aware / aware of agent 1’s bias b1 > 0. Moreover, an
analogous argument shows that agent 1’s effort in case he is partially aware
is larger than his effort in case he is unaware of agent 2’s bias, i.e. epk1 ≥ e0k1
(with equality if p = 0). Thus, taken together, we have
e1k1 ≥ epk1 ≥ e0k1 . (37)
Note that agent 2’s effort does not depend on agent 1’s awareness of agent
2’s bias but only on agent 2’s awareness of his colleague’s bias (see also the
discussion of Case 1-3 in Section 4):
e1k2 = e
pk
2 = e
0k
2 . (38)
Next, we compare agent 1’s equilibrium payoffs depending on whether
he is (partially) aware or unaware of agent 2’s bias. In order to do so, we
denote his equilibrium payoff by R1(exk1 , e
xk
2 )− c(exk1 ), where x, k ∈ [0, 1], and
x denotes agent 1’s awareness status of agent 2’s bias. – Recall that agent 1
is biased himself so that his effort is higher than optimal irrespective of his
awareness status regarding agent 2’s bias. – As R1(e1, e2)− c(e1) is concave
in e1 and e
1k
1 ≥ epk1 ≥ e0k1 , we have
R1(e1k1 , e
pk
2 )− c(e1k1 ) ≤ R1(epk1 , epk2 )− c(epk1 ) ≤ R1(e0k1 , epk2 )− c(e0k1 ). (39)
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Thus, we conclude
Lemma A.1 An agent is best off being unaware of the colleague’s bias; and
being partially aware is better than being fully aware.
For agent 2 it also holds that his effort is higher if he is partially aware
than if he is unaware and highest if he is aware of agent 1’s bias — irrespective
of agent 1’s awareness status x ∈ [0, 1], i.e. ex12 ≥ exp2 ≥ ex02 . Since agent 1’s
effort does not vary with his colleague’s awareness status, i.e. ex11 = e
xp
1 = e
x0
1 ,
we have
R1(ex11 , e
x1
2 )− c(ex11 ) ≥ R1(exp1 , exp2 )− c(exp1 ) ≥ R1(ex01 , ex02 )− c(ex01 ). (40)
Thus, we conclude
Lemma A.2 An overconfident agent is best off if the colleague is aware of
the bias; and partial awareness is better than unawareness.
B. Comparison: 2 Overconfident vs. 2 Rational Agents
Both overconfident agents are aware of their colleague’s bias.
If both agents are overconfident and aware of their colleague’s bias, we have:
Ri(e11i , e
∗
−i)− c(e11i ) < Ri(e∗i , e∗−i)− c(e∗i ), (41)
as Ri is concave and e11i > e
∗
i = arg maxei R
i(ei, e
∗
−i)−c(ei). Yet, as e11−i > e∗−i,
it holds that:
Ri(e11i , e
11
−i)− c(e11i ) > Ri(e∗i , e∗−i)− c(e∗i ), (42)
provided that synergy effects are sufficiently large. And this also holds if
biases are moderate (as a small bias results in a moderate increase of effort
and therefore a smaller “synergetic feedback” through agent −i’s effort is
required).
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Only one overconfident agent is aware of his colleague’s bias.
Similar to the above argument individual payoffs again are higher than for
a fully rational team if synergy effects are sufficiently large or biases are
moderate:
Ri(e01i , e
01
−i)− c(e01i ) > Ri(e∗i , e∗−i)− c(e∗i ), (43)
with e01i > e
∗
i and e
01
−i > e
∗
−i and, hence, U
01
i > U
∗
i . The argument is
analogous to the one before.
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